

**THE REVOLUTION
IS DEAD
LONG LIVE
THE REVOLUTION**

3907



**EDITED BY
THE 70'S**

The Revolution is
Dead
Long Live
The Revolution

Readings
On The Great Proletarian
Cultural Revolution
From
An Ultra-Left
Perspective

Compiled
And Edited
By
The 70's

3908

(ii)

CONTENTS

Preface iv

SECTION ONE

The Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution and the
Reversal of workers' power in China 1
by Progressive Labour Party

China: Let a hundred flowers bloom 44
by Nigel Harris

On "The Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution" 70
by F.H. Wang

3909

SECTION TWO

Mao's China and the "Proletarian Cultural Revolution" 108
by Raya Dunayevskaya

The Explosion Point of Ideology in China 123
by Situationist International

Theses on the Chinese Revolution 136
by Cajo Brendel

"Everything remains the same after so much Ado." 166
by K.C. Kwok

(iii)

SECTION THREE

Whither China? 180
by Sheng-Wu-Lien

The Dusk of Rationality 201
by Yu Shuet

Introduction To Revelations that move the Earth to Tears ... 227
by Wu Man

An Interview with An Ultra-Leftist 240

Concerning Socialist Democracy and
 Legal System 249
by Li I-Che

Appendix

Some thoughts on the Chinese Revolution 289
by Lee Yu See and Wu Che

3 9 1 1

MAO'S CHINA

AND

THE "PROLETARIAN CULTURAL REVOLUTION"

(Written for *New Politics*, Dec. 31, 1967)

108

By Raya Dunayevskaya

Raya Dunayevskaya was secretary to Leon Trotsky during his exile in Mexico, but broke with him at the time of the Hitler - Stalin pact because Trotsky insisted that Russia had to be defended. She, on the contrary, asserted that the Russian Revolution had degenerated into a state capitalist tyranny. Since the 1940s she has been closely associated with American workers' movements and has written on numerous aspects of the class struggle as well as lecturing widely on the subject in the United States, Western Europe and Africa. She is at present chairman of the National Editorial Board of the American publication News and Letters, a Marxist-Humanist group based in Detroit.

Raya Dunayevskaya is the author of two books, Marxism and Freedom, and Philosophy and Revolution.

Of Marxist Humanism, Raya Dunayevskaya has written, "Marxist Humanism will remain alive so long as a new world on truly new, human beginnings has not been established. Totalitarian Communism understands this so well that the counter-revolutionary suppression of the Hungarian Revolution went hand-in-hand with the suppression of thought the great Hungarian Revolution raised the Humanist flag clearly. Because Marxist Humanism, to me, is the only genuine ground from which to oppose Communist totalitarianism, I felt the compulsion to show that Humanism is not something invented by me, but came directly from Marx who fought what

3911

he called "vulgar Communism," writing that communism, as such, is not the goal of human development, the form of human society."

"Mao's China and the Proletarian Cultural Revolution" originally appeared in *New Politics* vol. 6, no. 2, Spring 1968 and was subsequently included in the second edition of *Marxism and Freedom*.

Now that the Cultural Revolution has slowed its pace, there is time to look at this startling phenomenon.

The Red Guards may appear to have emerged out of nowhere, but in 1966 they arrived one million strong in para-military formation to hear Lin Piao, Mao's "closest comrade in arms," explain the big-character posters at THE HEADQUARTERS." They learned that the headquarters were in the Communist Party where they would find "persons in authority taking capitalism." When these teenagers streamed out of the square they seemed something harder than "Mao's Thought."

For the next month the bourgeois press had a field day describing the attacks against "all the old" in China, from Confucian texts and priceless art treasures to Communist leaders. It was even more bizarre to follow the young Maoists attacking Western imperialism, not so much the living, barbarous U.S. imperialism as the bombs on a Communist ally, North Vietnam, but against "Hong Kong imperialism," bourgeois-feudal reactionary music of Bach, Beethoven and Shostakovich.

Within a couple of months, those teenage hooligans were doing mischief in the streets, putting dunce caps on "anti-revolutionaries." By the end of the Cultural Revolution, the Red Guard and "Red Rebel" groups had abandoned their former headquarters at embassies to go into formerly forbidden ground, the factories and fields. "Red Guard committees" tried to oust established factory managers while inciting strikes over the workers and forbidding strikes. Soon not only the Western press but the Chinese press was talking of "civil war."

But where was this civil war? In Sinkiang, where army units disarmed the control committees? In a "handful" of anti-Maoists within the Communist Party? It existed only in Mao's overactive imagination, what was its purpose? The conditions impelled the transformation of the Cultural Revolution into a chaos have called "a giddy whirl of self-perpetuating disorder?" To what extent was its order, that is, planned from above? To what extent had its internal dynamics pushed it beyond the boundaries set for it?

The anti-Maoist bourgeois press, the Maoists and their apologists have described the Cultural Revolution as nothing short of a "second revolution."¹ The bourgeois press depicts Mao as a man looking back nostalgically to the days of the Long March into occasional fits of paranoia. The Maoists and their apologists paint a picture of Mao (there are 840 million actual portraits²) which shows him forever young, forever forward, forever combatting those Party, State and army bureaucrats who have blocked the new generation from the path of "uninterrupted revolution" to the path of "continuous revolution."

Factual information about events in China is hard to find. But the description of a "second revolution" can be assessed. What is necessary to understand China in its world context, especially in the period immediately preceding

is time to take a closer

ere, but on August 18,
o hear Defense Minister
ter poster "BOMBARD
rs were those of the
aking the road back to
ey seemed armed with

describing the rampage
art treasures, to many
ng Maoists' attacks on
rialism that was raining
ong haircuts" and the
akovitch."

110

ing more than roaming
end of 1966, a prolif-
ir forays against foreign
d fields. "Seize control
ating them in lording it
rn press but the official

its disobeyed the seize
munist Party? And if it
rpose? What objective
into what Hegel might
extent was its disorder
ernal dialectic propelled

ologists all describe the
The bourgeois analysts
ong March and slipping
paint a portrait of Mao
young, forever moving
rats who would lead the
path of revisionism.

l. But the value of this
necessary is, first, to see
preceding the Cultural

3913

Revolution and, second, to keep one's pre-suppositions aside so that the dialectic of the Cultural Revolution can be followed in and for itself. This is particularly important because the origins of the Cultural Revolution are tangled inextricably with the course of the war in Vietnam.

THE CRUCIAL YEAR: 1965

When Mao came to power in China he saw no need for mass participation in any "uninterrupted revolution." Indeed, it was not until seven years later, in 1956, that he saw a need to convene a Congress of the Chinese Communist Party, which had last met eleven years before, in 1945. The 1956 Congress declared China to be "state capitalist,"³ a formulation with which this author agrees. Within a month the Hungarian Revolution erupted. It was soon followed by voices of revolt in China,⁴ whereupon Mao thought up the Great Leap Forward, which would bring China "directly to Communism," bypassing both capitalism and "socialism." Instead, it brought the country to the edge of famine. Shortly thereafter, Mao stepped down as head of state, while retaining his post as Chairman of the CCP. 111

The American decision to bomb North Vietnam in February 1965 put the Communist world to the test. China, which had pictured itself as the besieged fortress, had to face the fact that U.S. imperialism had turned North Vietnam into a genuinely besieged fortress. Kossygin's visit to Peking immediately after seemed to bode a closing of Communist ranks, or at least a united front to help Hanoi. But nothing of the sort happened. Mao had quite a different perspective. For him, 1965 was to see the turning point in the struggle for world dominance. Against the U.S.-NATO axis and the Moscow-Warsaw axis, he projected a Peking-Djakarta axis. Nothing, least of all a united front with Russia to help the Vietnamese fight U.S. imperialism could be allowed to interfere with that perspective and the strategy that flowed from it. Where the others were ready to hold world perspectives in abeyance once the strategy of a Peking-Djakarta axis disintegrated, Mao became the more adamant in his single-mindedness of China as the central and sole leader of "world revolution," to which Vietnam must be subordinated.

In September 1965, an attempted coup against military leaders in Indonesia failed. On October 1, the military started a bloodbath against Communists and other oppositionists which resulted in the slaughter of hundreds of thousands. Any perspective of a Peking-Djakarta axis was quashed for the foreseeable future. Despite more recent⁵ attempts to rewrite the history of the Indonesian Communist Party (KPI), in October 1965 not even Mao could think of a way to lay the blame for the greatest disaster in Communist history at the door of "Russian Revisionism." Aidit, the KPI leader, had aligned his party with China as soon as Mao came to power. Peng Chen acknowledged that Aidit's ascendancy dated from his acceptance of Maoism.⁶ If the KPI's line was characterized by

3914

3-9-1-5

class collaboration rather than class struggle⁷, if "peaceful coexistence" was the direction of the Chinese Communist Party's actions, it was at the direction of the Chinese Communist Party. The collapse of the Peking-Djakarta axis was the result not only of counter-revolution in Indonesia but of the class collaborationist line of the KPI which prepared the ground. And that line was laid down in Peking.

For Mao, the Indonesian crisis was a test of the ability of his Chinese leadership to draw "the correct conclusions." Apparently, many of the members of the Politburo were only under pressure for a united front with Russia exerted by outside Communist Parties, including the North Korean, but reports leaked from the Japanese Communist Party that Shao-sh'i was not the only Chinese leader who pressed for such a united front. This was the last straw. His own cadres had not properly understood the situation, but he was mounting and watching the fight of the tigers." The Russians did not want to maintain international tensions . . . There is every reason to assert that the goals of the policy of the Chinese leadership in the Vietnam question were a military confrontation between the USSR and the United States.⁸ The Politburo Committee, however, still had to learn who the main enemy was.⁹

No wonder the Cultural Revolution had been limping along, resolutely. The leadership would have to be shaken up, hardened or discarded or "disappear."

The Chinese press and the wall posters now reveal that during the period from November 1965 to May 1966, when Mao dropped out of sight and his name in the Western press ranged from "ill health" to "perhaps even death," the "oppressive atmosphere" of Peking to prepare the Proletarian Cultural Revolution. When he returned he was ready to take on not only the foreign parties but the Politburo Committee as well as readying the so-called Red Guards. He summoned the Politburo for the first in four years, to meet on August 1. The resolution of this bod was an answer to those who had called for a united front with Russia on the Politburo Plenary sessions maintain that to oppose imperialism it is imperative to reject revisionism. There is no middle road whatsoever . . . It is imperative to expose their (Russian Communists') true features as scabs. It is impossible to work with them."¹⁰

"Russian revisionism" was not alone in being rejected. The other world were rebuffed: any that did not acknowledge the CCP as the sole Communist Party were denigrated.* Internally, the title of "Chairman Mao in-arms," passed from Liu to Lin Biao. All motions were carried unanimously.

Now Mao was ready to transform the Cultural Revolution. The means of this transformation, not at the Plenum, but at a mass rally, was a "new force," divorced not only from the legal structures of Mao's Sing

3 9 1 6

istence" underlay all the
nist Party. In short, the
inter-revolutionary terror
prepared the way for it.

is Central Committee to
bers failed this test. Not
side Communist parties,
ese CP indicate that Liu
a united front. For Mao
od the tale of "sitting on
did understand the tale:
lengthy Vietnam war to
sert that it is one of the
question to originate a
"8 The Chinese Central

ig, restricted to the arts.
scarded. Mao decided to

during the critical period
ight and the speculations
n death," he had left the
ultural Revolution. When
ties but his own Central
mmoned a Party Plenum,
is body gave a categorical
n the Vietnam war: "The
erative to oppose modern
ative resolutely to expose
ole to have 'united action'

The other CPs around the
s the sole leader of world
n Mao's closest comrade-
nanimously.
tion. He announced the
s rally in Peking. It was a
s Single Party-State-Army

112

3915

but from production itself. All schools were to be closed for an entire year. Rootless teenagers, who owed loyalty to none but Mao, who know no world outside of Mao's China, for whom both history and revolution existed only as they "made" them, would carry through the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution.

THE RED GUARDS

... pure Insight ... completes the stage of culture. It takes nothing but the self ... it comprehends everything, extinguishes all objectiveness.

- Hegel, *Phenomenology of Mind*

"Shoot Brezhnev!" "Burn Kosygin!" These were some of the posters carried by the Red Guards who surrounded the Russian Embassy in Peking, marching, singing, shouting and harassing anyone who ventured out for food. But this was not exclusively an anti-Russian act, it was part of the process of "hardening" the Chinese and some self-created havoc in China was not viewed as too high a price to pay for achieving this objective.

When the Sino-Soviet conflict first burst into the open in 1960, the Chinese masses were confused and dismayed. As one refugee told me:

We had no specific love for the Russians; there had actually been very little contact between Russians and Chinese. But the regime itself had always played up the Russians as our greatest friends and Stalin's *History of the Communist Party* had been studied as much as any work by Mao. And now all we heard about them was that they were "revisionists." Somehow, instead of hatred against the Russians, a feeling of utter isolation descended upon all of us.

No feeling of isolation ever bothered Mao. He is forever ready to make a "great Leap Forward" over objective conditions, confident that will and hard work, especially hard work by 700 million souls, can achieve miracles, "Make one day equal twenty years." Far from leaving the miraculous work by itself, however, the CCP spelled it out as follows: "Each person must work ten hours and engage in ideological studies for two hours a day. They are entitled to one day of rest every ten days ..."

The voices of revolt heard during the brief period of the "One Hundred Flowers" campaign and again during the disastrous "Great Leap Forward", which brought the

"China was not about to forget that Cuba had dared to make a public statement about Chinese methods and procedures being 'exactly the same as the ones used by the United States Embassy in our country ... our country had liberated itself from the imperialism 99 miles from our shores and it was not willing to permit another powerful state to come 20,000 kilometers to impose similar practices on us."

113

3916

country to near famine, were silent during the development of the Sino-Soviet conflict. Despite the absence of similar manifestations of opposition, Mao nevertheless insisted on the creation of Red Guards for his new Great Leap Forward.

While in 1960 the Chinese masses were dismayed at their isolation, in 1966 it was the Russians who were dismayed. For the Red Guards, the enemy was not only "Russian revisionism" but Russia itself. Mao's favorite statement remained: "You learn to make revolutions by making them just as you learn to swim by swimming." The Red Guards were told daily that they were, indeed, "making revolution." So satisfied was Mao with the work of the Red Guards in the months of August and September that he was thinking of institutionalizing them. As the *Peking Review* was to express it later: "When Chairman Mao, the red sun which shines most brightly in our hearts and our most respected and beloved supreme commander, received in Peking a million young Red Guards, not only had a 'new day dawned' but no holds were barred against anti-Maoists.

This new leap, like its capitalized predecessor, tripped over the objective conditions it scorned. In the course of the Maoist terror mass opposition surfaced. Somehow the "handful" of anti-Maoists had managed to "dupe" so many that the ruling clique admitted that "perhaps we are temporarily in a minority." Even more important, the opposition had roots directly in production, in the factories and the fields. They were, in fact, the proletarian and peasant masses. They wore no red armbands, waved no books of quotations from Mao but they went out on unprecedented strikes and fought pitched battles with the Red Guard "seize control committee" that invaded their factories.

Mao, like other rulers, capitalist and Communist, is so convinced of the backwardness of the masses that he was taken by surprise. At first he said that the masses had been "duped by the economists, the revisionists." Considering that the Red Guards were his invention and that he had been so satisfied with their vicious vandalism against the "old culture" and "persons in authority taking the road back to capitalism" during the months of August and September, he had now to make a decision: whether to follow the Red Guards as they shifted from these attacks into those on "management" of production. He allowed criticism to appear on the wall posters against Chou En-lai who had asked the Red Guards to keep out of production and away from the agricultural communes. Then the *Red Flag* began to write against "phony" Red Guards who "wave the red flag to attack the red flag." Finally, however, both the *People's Daily* and the *Red Flag* printed editorial warnings to "industry" that it was not sacrosanct.

Of all the myths created by the "Cultural Revolution", none is a greater hoax than Mao's dependence on, and confidence in, the youth. His readiness to turn away from his old "comrades-in-arms" was not for purposes of leaving the fate of "the world revolution". Sino-centered, in the hands of the youth. As Mao himself had told Snow in 1965. "the youth could negate the revolution."¹¹ The Army alone had always enjoyed his confidence, became the crux of his original contributions to "Marxism," was incorporated

into the Constitution. On the other hand, he at no time trusted the youth, in or out of power. This distrust rose to fever pitch in 1958 when it became clear that they were in the forefront of the opposition both to his Thought in the 100 Flowers Campaign and to his Great Leap Forward. He sent them to build the dams, not to become the "ruling cadres".

There is no country on earth where the leadership is kept in such old hands. The Politburo members average close to 70 years; even the alternate members average 63. For a brief moment in 1964 it looked as if Mao might entrust some serious responsibilities to the Communist youth organization as he spoke to it about "successor generations." However, even that brief moment in the sun was surrounded by the slogan "Learn from the Army". And, indeed, the whole of 1965, it was the Army that was to be emulated, especially as it "studies Mao's Thought." Then not only was the plan jettisoned but so was the whole youth organization, when, seemingly, the Red Guards were created.

Far from proving Mao's unshakeable confidence in the youth, the creation of the Red Guards is a manifestation of his belief that the country, including the youth, had to be "shaken up", had to be made to live by and sleep by (literally, with the "little red book" at their sides) Mao's Thought. It is true that, in the New Year editorials, it seemed as if Mao was following the Red Guards' demands to have a say in management of production. No one knows how many have been arrested or taken to prison and tortured or actually beaten to death; estimates run as high as 60,000 prisoners and thousands beaten to death¹² but the talk now of the "indiscipline"¹³ of Red Guards does not augur well for them either. In any case, the masses, workers and peasants, did rise up against the new badgering, and the dissolution of the trade unions did nothing to stop the anger of the masses against the regime. The bitter and bloody struggles had begun. Nothing helped much. The point of no return had been reached. The deluge came. Soon the press in the West and in China itself was talking of "civil war."

In reality, what followed can best be called a "preventive civil war," deliberately provoked by Mao. But in provoking it he sealed the fate of his regime. The immediate outcome of the current struggle cannot affect that fate. In unleashing this struggle he has laid bare not only the divisions in the ruling stratum but the *class* divisions between rulers and ruled. Mao is caught by the objective conditions of a world divided between two and only two giant industrial powers. He does not have the advantage Stalin had, the use of world CPs as outposts of his foreign policy. He has no confidence in the world proletariat, and the Chinese proletariat has no confidence in him. They are finished with "Great Leaps Forward" that throw them backward. In this situation, to take the rootless elements and transform them into the tools of the ruling clique is the only answer, and it is no answer. Mao, his heirs and his "cultural revolutionaries" cannot escape the non-viability of the state capitalist system they have created, the end product of which is "Mao's Thought."

REVOLUTION OR RETROGRESSION?

Some self-styled revolutionaries are ready to forgive Mao every crime in the book and leave a few blank pages for those he might invent later, on the ground that he is the foe of U.S. imperialism which is the chief enemy of world revolution. They are ignorant of fundamental class divisions within each country, China included, and illogically link those opposites, war and revolution.

Fighting wars is Mao's specialty. He knows the problems far more intimately than he knows Marxism, and on guerrilla warfare he is a genius. But the problems he now faces at home, on his Russian borders¹⁴, and in the struggle against "Russian revisionism" cannot be solved by guerrilla warfare. Neither at home nor abroad is he leading a fight against hated enemies — the ruling class he, himself, represents, or an imperialist occupying power. Rather, Mao's fight is directed against the Chinese masses at home and Russia abroad.

The world hadn't learned of the Sino-Soviet conflict until 1960, but, in fact, Mao's price for helping Russia crush the Hungarian Revolution and resist Poland's challenge to Russia's leadership of the Communist world was the 1957 nuclear pact. It was only when "in the spirit of Camp David" Khrushchev reneged on sharing Russia's nuclear know-how with China that Mao turned against the policies of "peaceful co-existence" he had devised at Bandung. Mao's substitute for the policies of "peaceful co-existence" was the declaration that the under-developed countries were the "storm centers of world revolution".

Throughout the period of 1960-64, while these ideological battles were splitting the Communist parties, what China was, in fact, concentrating on was the creation of its own *force de frappe*. China's first atomic explosion in 1964 came on the eve of Khrushchev's fall. The following year his answer to those who wanted to enter into common action with Russia when the United States began to rain bombs on North Vietnam was to devise "a spontaneous, new type of organization" (the Red Guards) that would teach his leadership just how Sino-centered "world revolution" is.

For some Western students of China, Mao's aim in the formation of the Red Guards was to create "an organization of a new type with built-in safeguards against bureaucracy,"¹⁵ as if a new type of organization can be created by ukase. Those who mix erudition with apologetics tell us — in the words of one apologist — that Mao "has always been fearful of controlled bureaucratic power." It is a little difficult to believe that a man who heads a vast totalitarian state and who whipped out a para-military organization overnight is so revolted by bureaucratic power. It is no less difficult to believe the writer who sees "something profoundly anti-organizational" in the formation of Mao's Red Guards. But then, Prof. Schurmann thought that the bloody Russian purges in the 1930's were for the purpose of bringing "the sons of workers into cadre positions at all levels of the organizational system." And now he likewise sees that the "sons and daughters of the poor are coming into leadership positions in China."¹⁶

book
is the
ant of
those

y than
faces
nism"
fight
pying
Russia

Mao's
age to
when
y-how
vised
clara-
ion".
g the
own
hev's
with
se "a
ader-

ards
ainst
o mix
ways
man
over-
who
ards.
e for
the
poor

Contrast this to the testimony of a young refugee from Mao's China who told me that living conditions had become so bad that the African students who had come to China looked rich by comparison: "We were very interested in these new arrivals, their countries, their revolution, but we were not permitted to fraternize with them. They were ghettoized both as to living quarters and any socializing. We also wanted to ask them for things we were short of, and we were stopped from doing that. We all felt very frustrated. I felt more strongly than ever that things were reeling backwards."

In this state capitalist age, revolution and counter-revolution are so interlocked that even those who understand the relationship of thought to objective conditions speak of Mao's "revolutionary fervor" and "revolutionary voluntarism." Hegel, instead of praising Stoicism saw it as "a general form of the world's spirit only in a time of universal fear and bondage."¹⁷ Marx saw the need to listen to impulses from a new, objective revolutionary force, the proletariat, and to transcend the ideas of others, whether bourgeois idealists, radical putschists or anarchist voluntarists, before a truly revolutionary philosophy of liberation could be elaborated. Lenin saw the need to show that, although "the petty bourgeois in a frenzy may also wish to smash up the state," what distinguished Bolshevik violence was that "we recognize only one road, changes from below - we wanted workers themselves to draw up, from below, the new principles of economic conditions."¹⁸ As against these discoverers of the dialectic of thought and the dialectics of liberation, men who could not conceive of the shaping of history without a "Subject," today's self-styled revolutionaries think it enough for "the supreme commander and great helmsman" to order social change for it to be realized. But is that revolution? Or liberation?

They see the enemy as "Russian revisionism." Russian Communism has, of course, not only revised Marxism but transformed it into its opposite. But that opposite is the very foundation of "Mao's Thought." In his recent, most basic¹⁹ and most revolutionary-sounding challenge to "Russian revisionism," *A Proposal Concerning the General Line of the International Communist Movement* Mao says:

For a very long historical period after the proletariat takes power, class struggle continues as an objective law independent of man's will For decades or even longer . . . for an entire historical period . . . there are classes and class struggles in all socialist countries without exception.

He repeats this theme over and over, concluding that it may remain true "perhaps for even a century."

But if classes and class struggles continue under "socialism", what is the point of overthrowing capitalism? Surely no more deadly deviation has ever been proclaimed as "a principle of Marxism-Leninism." This is not a theory of revolution. It is a theory of retrogression, all the more serious since it is proclaimed not in the name of fascism but of Marxism-Leninism.

Mao has always propounded "protracted struggle," raising it to the level of theory.

But to the masses this is not theory, it is the weight of exploitation endure in all class societies, except that it was not called "socialism. refugee, after telling about work during the "Great Leap Forward" - "labor imaginable, as if we were to build a whole dam by hand. We Jacke devices as a block and tackle to lift heavy rocks. These had to be pu sheer brute force" - insisted that the worst was not the work-but the d that followed:

We didn't know which was the hardest to bear - the labor meetings. We had to describe what we did that day, and we had attitude to what we did. Although I had volunteered for the job Forward sounded great to me at Peita (Peking University) - I ne if all our labor was forced labor. I kept my tongue, but you co quiet, since if you kept silent your team leader would see you what was the matter. I felt like I was nothing more than an ant, n the unthinking labor but because you so often said yes when y Moreover, my own experience kept intruding into the study of they didn't jibe either theoretically or practically. But I didn't da or even to myself.

A spectre is haunting Mao, the spectre of the Hungarian Revolut boasts that he urged Khrushchev to send the tanks into Budapest. To th has consistently fought the humanism of Marx:²⁰ "The modern rev bourgeois scholars describe Marxism as humanism and call Marx a particular they make use of certain views on 'alienation' expressed by *Economic-Philosophic Manuscripts*, 1844 In the early stage of de thought Marx and Engels were indeed somewhat influenced by huma when they formulated the materialist conception of history and di struggle as the motive force of social development, they immediate influence."

A basic document of the Cultural Revolution, "Raise High the Gr Tse-tung's Thought and Carry the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolutio End," openly admits: "If serious steps were not taken to remold them they were bound at some future date to become groups like the Club."²¹

The Red Guards were intended to be the agents of that "remo built outside the structure of the CCP, not so much to fight "the bu:ea those on top and those on the bottom to face the realities of China's divided between two industrially advanced lands. In such a world, backward country like China that has no perspective of world revolut feels compelled to drive the masses all the harder. Under private capitali

as primitive accumulation; under state capitalism, calling itself Communism, it is called, internally, "fighting self-interest"²², and, externally, "Mao Tse-tung's Thought Lights Up the Whole World."²³ The country it now lights has already sunk to the barbarity and depravity of televised public executions. The "self-interest" it now fights is not so much that of "the main person in authority taking the road back to capitalism" as the interests of the Chinese masses, including those they now call "phoney" Red Guards: "large scale struggles of masses with masses, work stoppages . . . armed struggle against real Red Guards." As we enter 1968, the issue has not been decided; despite the command of the Army, that permanent restorer of class order, not all of the rival Red Guard groups in factories and communes have joined "a single organ based on systems." While Mao, on his 74th birthday, holds to his "theory of revolution", that the success of socialism "requires from one to several centuries", The masses see only retrogression down that road. As one refugee from Mao's China expressed it:

"Retrogression, that's it; that really is it. Mao is a retrogressionist. That's the word that escaped me when I said everything seemed to be reeling backwards. That word hadn't come into my consciousness because I was afraid to face its consequences. But retrogression does really sum up Mao's Thought . . . Humanist tendencies are very strong among the Chinese. It can raise their spirits once more. I believe the youth stands ready to make a new revolution."

Whether or not the Peking University student is right or wrong in her analysis of the present situation, it is clear that the forces unleashed by the "Cultural Revolution" have by no means been stilled. And Mao's latest campaign against the "ultra-leftist" concept of "doubting all and overthrowing all" is proof of the fact that the "Cultural Revolution" has escaped the confines set for it.

FOOTNOTES

1. "Mao's Second Revolution", by K.S. Karol, *New Statesman*, Sept. 1966. Mr. Karol has since outdone himself by explaining that the deification of Mao's Thought is needed to preserve "the legitimacy of the Chinese Revolution and the socialist perspective that it has opened before the country." See the Introduction to his book on China, reprinted as "Why the Cultural Revolution?" *Monthly Review*, Sept. 1967.
2. *Peking Review* #31, July 28, 1967: "More than 840 million copies of portraits of Chairman Mao, or over five times the number produced in the preceding 18 years, were printed in the eleven months from July 1966 to the end of May 1967 . . . There are 33 different portraits of the great leader of the world's people."
3. *Documents of the First Session of the First National People's Congress of the People's Republic of China*. Foreign Language Press, Peking, 1955. Repeated in

I to
nism
tive
ple
by
ngs

the
our
eap
l as
eep
ask
e of
118
ht"
oud

he
ina
me
In
arly
neir
But
lass
this

fao
the
als)
rofi

ere
orce
brld
ally
te"
wn

Eighth National Congress of the CCP. Vol. 1 (Documents), Peking, 1956.

4. The best work is *The Hundred Flowers Campaign and the Chinese Intellectuals*, by Roderick MacFarquhar (New York: Praeger, 1960). See also *Communist China: the Politics of the Student Opposition* by Dennis Doolin (Stanford Univ. Press, 1964).
5. *Peking Review* #30, July 21, 1967
6. *Peking Review*, June 4, 1965. Also reprints Aidit's and Sukarno's speeches.
7. For further discussion of the KPI, see my three articles, "Indonesian Communism: A Case of World Communism's Decomposition" in *News & Letters* (Detroit), October and November 1965.
8. From a "secret" letter of the CPSU to other CPs, published by *Die Welt* (Hamburg) and reprinted in the *New York Times*, March 14, 1966.
9. It is interesting to contrast what *Peking Review* (No. 35, August 25, 1967) writes now, "Peng Teh-huai and His Behind-the-Scenes Boss Cannot Shirk Responsibility for Their Crimes", with what was the official story even as late as 1965, which Edgar Snow (*The Other Side of the River*, p. 641) reports as follows: "Peng also became keenly aware of China's dependence on Soviet material and technical aid . . . P'eng neither led any 'conspiracy' against Mao, as reported abroad, nor was 'arrested.' The Chinese party leadership does not work that way. P'eng still holds his seat in the Politburo." 120
10. The Plenum Resolution, excerpted, was printed in *The New York Times*, August 14, 1966. Naturally it has been reproduced in full in *Peking Review*.
11. The interview granted Edgar Snow in January, 1965, was published in *The New Republic*, February 27, 1965.
12. Stuart Schram, in the revised 1967 edition of his Mao Tse-tung, who has been an analyst quite sympathetic to China, and stressed the great achievements of Mao, has made this estimate. The official broadcasts and statements speak only of "masses" never reporting actual figures of the total number arrested, beaten and humiliated much less those actually killed.
13. When Mrs. Mao Tse-tung made her first attack on the Red Guards in September 26, 1967, she told them: "It's a mistake to go running around the streets. Last year was the time to kindle the flames of revolution. To go into the streets now is precisely the wrong thing to do." By December 1967 Lin Piao reminded the Red Guards that they must remember the Red Army "cherishes" them and they must therefore obey and reveal their own "selfish" shortcomings.
14. *Look*, October 3, 1967, carries an article by A. Doak Barnett, "Tensions on the China-Soviet Border", with a map which details the disputed borders which China now says were gotten as a result of "unequal treaties."
15. *Mao Tse-tung* by Stuart Schram (Penguin, Baltimore, 1967). The most perceptive as well as scholarly analysis of the national streak in Chinese Communism, including

that of Mao Tse-tung, is not, however, in a study of Mao, but in a study of a founder of Chinese Marxism, *Li Ta-Chao and the Origins of Chinese Marxism* by Maurice Meisner (Harvard Univ. Press, Cambridge, 1967)

16. A strange admixture of apologetics and erudition characterizes Professor Franz Schurmann's major work, *Ideology and Organization in Communist China*, which he had modestly introduced with these words: "The writing of this book has been like the Chinese Revolution, a long process climaxed by an act", which, however, despite the seven years of research (1957-65) in Chinese, Japanese and Malayan languages, did not result in any analysis of the army. As the work went to press, Lin Piao made his famous speech on "People's War", where he likened the industrial countries of the world to "the city", and all the technologically underdeveloped countries to "the country" which would surround the city and win, just as Mao had done in China. Whereupon Prof. Schurmann rushes into print as if the speech, rather than the Army Lin now heads, accounts for the Army's importance; "After I had completed this book, I realized that I had omitted an important area of organization: the army." By the time he made that admission still another "area of organization arose: the Red Guards." Professor Schurmann was prepared with analysis of that too (*New York Review of Books* October 20, 1966). It seems that "thousands of young students swarmed into the streets and formed the red defense guards." And, after testifying to the spontaneity of this "mass movement," he has since written very nearly everywhere (See especially *Diplomat*, September 1966 and his answer to Professor Levenson's critique of his piece in the *New York Review of Books*) on the thesis that "Mao Tse-tung has always been fearful of concentrated bureaucratic power and the present purge may be said to conform to his general approach to politics."
17. G.W.F. Hegel, *Phenomenology of Mind*, p. 245. The work is finally available in paperback.
18. *Selected Works*, Vol. VII, p. 377
19. The Plenum Resolution in August 1966 reiterates this to be "the programmatic document" that must continue to be studied as it gives a "scientific Marxist-Leninist analysis of a series of important questions concerning the world revolution of our time . . ."
20. The Fourth Enlarged Session of the Committee of the Department of Philosophy and Social Science of the Chinese Academy of Sciences held on October 26, 1963, was specially devoted to that problem. See *The Fighting Tasks Confront Workers in Philosophy and the Social Sciences* (Peking, 1963).
21. This quotation from the *Peking Review* is used by Ellis Joffe in his important article "Cultural Revolution or Struggle for Power" in *China Quarterly*, July-September 1966 which has a special section on "China Mid-1966." Especially important on the cultural aspects is "The Fall of Chou Yang" by Merle Goldman who has just

by

the

A

ber

urq)

ites

lity

gar

ame

eng

The

the

14,

New

n an

, has

ses"

ated

r 26,

was

y the

they

y and

n the

China

ive as

uding

3-9-75

published an excellent work not limited to the present "Cultural Revolution."

22. *New York Times*, Dec. 31, 1967. On Dec. 26, 1967, Mao's 74th birthday, the official Chinese news agency announced that no less than one-half a billion copies of Mao's works have been published in 23 languages. They pointed out that before the Cultural Revolution there were only 13 plants publishing his works but now there are 180 plants, and they publish them in foreign languages as well.
23. *The Peking Review* has established a new section with this title.